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IntroductIon
In Germany, the idea of evidence-based policy as a model of modern 
policy- making has not engendered as much enthusiasm as in other coun-
tries, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world (Jun and Grabow 2008; 
Knieps 2009). German policy-makers and researchers are broadly in agree-
ment that scientific evidence has become more relevant to policy-making 
over time to address increasingly complex policy problems and to provide 
legitimacy for potentially unpopular decisions (Renn 1995; Mayntz 2009). 
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There is also an ever growing demand for expertise met by an array of 
scientific advisory committees, research institutes, expert commissions and 
expert networks providing advice to government (Kloten 2006; Siefken 
2007; Jun and Grabow 2008; Blum and Schubert 2013). This is particu-
larly visible in health care policy, in which scientific evidence use has 
become institutionally embedded, for example, through the creation of 
the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut für 
Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) (IQWiG 
2015) as a provider of independent health technology assessments in the 
corporatist sector.
However, much scepticism about the role of scientific evidence exists 
outside the narrow confines of health technology assessment, with some 
commentators seeing references to evidence representing little more than 
‘scientifically cloaked lobbyism’ (Knieps 2009). The complexity of the 
policy process in Germany – with its multitude of actors that exist within 
a federal, corporatist system, and the dominance of legislation over other 
forms of policy-making  – would not lend itself to support notions of 
evidence- based policy.
Policy scholars have frequently noted the role of corporatism in health 
policy in Germany, which has given organised interests a central role in 
decision-making (Lehmbruch 1988; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). The 
state has delegated a wide range of governance tasks to the respective asso-
ciations of office-based doctors (i.e. family doctors as well as specialists), 
hospitals and sickness funds, which include, for example, decisions about 
public reimbursement of pharmaceuticals and medical services, and the 
definition of rules relating to quality assurance and reimbursement 
(Bandelow 2004). The same organised interests also have substantial 
influence on law making both at federal and state levels. For a long time, 
political parties had clear allegiances to specific interests, for example, the 
Social Democrats (SPD) tending to support the role of sickness funds 
while the Free Democrats (FDP) sought opportunities to extend the scope 
of private insurance, although these allegiances are not as clear as they 
used to be.
Provider organisations, especially those representing office-based doc-
tors, used to be particularly influential and able to influence, and stymie, 
policy proposals as veto players within decision-making processes (Tsebelis 
2011). Yet over the years the power dynamics between actors have 
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changed, bringing about new patterns of organisational behaviour 
(Bandelow 2009). Consecutive reforms have strengthened sickness funds 
vis-à-vis provider organisations (e.g. by changing voting rules in commit-
tees) thus shifting the balance between payers and providers (Bandelow 
2009). The federal government has also become more assertive in setting 
the national framework for corporatist decision-making. This was accom-
panied by the creation of new organisations through the merger of several 
associations of sickness funds into one, the Gemeinsame Spitzenverband, 
and by bringing together several committees to form the Federal Joint 
Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, GBA). The latter was aimed 
at professionalising and formalising the process of health policy-making 
and now forms the top decision-making body within the corporatist sec-
tor (Gerlinger 2010).
Traditional alliances have also weakened and lines of opposition have 
become blurred. Physicians associations now face the difficulty of repre-
senting doctors in primary and secondary care who are often pitched 
against each other in questions of resource allocation. Likewise, the 
German Hospital Association (Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft) repre-
sents all hospitals providing publicly funded services, irrespective of their 
size, ownership status and type of services provided. Policy changes such 
as the introduction of activity-based payments has also increased the com-
petition between hospitals for patients and funding. Thus changes in pol-
icy  – be they targeted at cost control or at securing quality of care  – 
increasingly affect provider organisations in different ways, making it 
more difficult for top associations to present a unified front. Commentators 
noted that while corporatist actors still wield substantial influence, the 
nature of corporatism has changed over time and become more pluralist, 
yet also more adversarial and less consensual in style (Bandelow 2004). 
These dynamics also play out in the ‘legalistic culture’ of German policy-
making, in which law-making and legal adjudication are crucial constitu-
ents of the policy process (Strueck 2013). In this chapter, it is argued that 
the changing style of decision-making is also demonstrated in the increased 
role of evidence use for both substantiating and legitimising decisions.
This chapter will explore how health policy actors in Germany have used 
scientific evidence to promote their aims and objectives, using the case of 
minimum volumes as a pertinent example. Based on the idea that quality 
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improves with greater experience in a given procedure (‘practice makes 
perfect’), minimum volumes have been introduced for a number of highly 
specialised hospital services as a measure of improving quality of care. The 
policy has also been introduced at the time of the formation of the GBA as 
the top decision making body of the self-administration in health care. 
Given that the latest lawsuit only concluded in December 2015 the discus-
sion about minimum policy allows for an analysis of the role of the GBA in 
professionalising health policy-making, which also changed the role of sci-
entific evidence.
The chapter will examine the role of evidence at three different stages 
of the policy process:
 – The making of the legislative framework taking place in the two 
chambers of parliament, the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and 
Federal Council (Bundesrat);
 – The definition of minimum volumes by the ‘corporatist’ self- 
administration, represented by the GBA; and
 – Legal adjudication in the social courts, charged with reviewing the 
legitimacy of minimum volumes set by the GBA.
It is not without irony that the idea of regulating minimum volumes as 
a measure of quality improvement was initially inspired by research: Studies 
in the United States suggested that hospitals that performed a larger num-
ber of highly complex surgeries produced better outcomes for patients 
than hospitals that provided these services less often (e.g. Birkmeyer et al. 
1999). The idea of turning volume-outcome relationships into a policy 
proposal has been credited to health economist and university professor 
Karl Lauterbach who, at the time, was an influential policy advisory to the 
Federal Minister of Health Ulla Schmidt. Minimum volumes were passed 
into law in 2002 and have been specified and operationalised in the years 
that followed, attracting much controversy as well as legal challenge from 
hospitals.
The following section provides an introduction into the literature on 
strategic evidence use, followed by a description of the study methods and 
a summary of the scientific evidence base for minimum volumes. The mid-
dle section of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of scientific 
evidence at different stages of the policy process. The chapter finishes with 
a discussion and conclusion.
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Table of key organisations and committees
German English Function
Ausschuss Krankenhaus Hospital 
Committee
Committee representing hospitals and 
sickness funds, mandated with decision- 
making for the hospital sector before 
2004
Bundesrat Federal Council Chamber of parliament representing the 
governments of the states (Länder)
Bundestag Federal 
Assembly
Chamber of parliament representing 
elected political parties
Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft
German 
Hospital 
Association
Federal-level association of hospitals
Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuss (GBA)
Federal Joint 
Committee
Top decision-making body of the 
corporatist self-administration in health 
care, since 2004
Gesundheitsausschuss Health 
Committee
Parliamentary committee, preparing 
health related legislation for the Bundestag
Vermittlungsausschuss Mediation 
Committee
Parliamentary committing, mediating 
between Bundestag and Bundesrat
StrategIc uSeS of evIdence In HealtH PolIcy-MakIng
Carol Weiss observed in her 1979 paper that scientific evidence can be 
used for at least seven purposes (Weiss 1979). ‘Instrumental’ use is what 
proponents of evidence-based policy usually have in mind when they 
demand for research findings to be taken account of in policy decisions. 
However, Weiss argued that research typically influences policy in more 
indirect ways, with knowledge from research filtering through to policy- 
makers over time and in often far more convoluted ways than ideas of 
straight forward application would suggest. ‘Political’ use implies that 
policy-makers utilise scientific evidence in a more active manner, yet for 
specific, politically driven purposes. Such use, also often called ‘symbolic’ 
or ‘tactical’, is therefore always selective, with policy-makers choosing 
those pieces of evidence that best promote their case. For the purists of 
evidence-based policy, strategic use comes close to ‘policy-based evidence’, 
defeating the purpose of ‘objective’ science of making policy better 
informed and more rational (Marmot 2004).
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However, for scholars of the policy process, selective use is by no means 
a surprise. Majone (1989) was one of the first to argue that evidence is 
typically used as a means of persuasion as part of a political argument. 
Greenhalgh and Russell (2007) found that evidence is often selected to fit 
an “argumentation game” played by policy actors by employing rhetoric 
and mobilising considerations of plausibility and reasonableness to achieve 
their aims. From that perspective, evidence use is better described as con-
stitutive of the “social drama” of policy-making rather than seen as an end 
in itself. Yet there is always the question of who uses evidence strategically 
and for which purpose. Hind, for example, has warned that both the state 
and corporations use science to legitimise their actions, which in his view 
constitutes a serious threat to reasoning and rationality, the core values of 
modern societies (Hind 2007).
The role of scientific evidence in legitimising decisions has also been 
extended to organisations. Boswell (2008), for example, has argued that 
scientific knowledge plays a key role in legitimising the role of the European 
Commission in immigration policy, a field that is frequently inflicted with 
controversy. A similar observation was made by Bijker et al. (2009) in their 
study of the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council) in the Netherlands. They 
observed that the Council successfully utilised the authority of science to 
legitimise its advice to policy, which occurs – paradoxically, as they argue – 
despite the fact that contemporary society has become more critical of 
research and more aware of the limits of science (for example in relation to 
genetically modified food) (Weingart 1999). McNulty (2012) noted that 
aid organisations increasingly commission programme evaluation for the 
purpose of demonstrating compliance with expectations of accountability 
and transparency.
To be clear, the focus on strategic evidence use does not imply that scien-
tific research is useless in informing policy-makers and in substantiating 
policy thinking in view of improving outcomes. However, it does raise the 
question of the motivation of policy-makers to use evidence and highlights 
the existence of considerations that have more to do with the nature of the 
policy process, the need to demonstrate accountability and the contested 
nature of decisions that affect the interests of policy actors than with concep-
tions of purely instrumental evidence use (Suchman 1995; Hansson 2006).
The case study of minimum volumes policy provides a pertinent exam-
ple of evidence use in the face of conflicting interests played out in a cor-
poratist system of health policy-making. The case also parallels controversies 
surrounding other decisions taken by the GBA, especially those to exclude 
or limit publicly funded services using health technology assessments 
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(HTA) (Perleth et al. 2009; Kieslich 2012). Such decisions can be highly 
controversial and pharmaceutical companies often take the GBA to court 
to challenge unfavourable outcomes. The threat of legal challenge requires 
the GBA to demonstrate the legitimacy of such decisions and it does so by 
reference to evidence reviews, commissioned from IQWIG, among other 
things. The role of HTA in legitimating potentially unpopular decisions 
about resource allocation (i.e. prioritisation, rationing) has also been criti-
cally discussed in relation to NICE, the National Institute of Health and 
Clinical Excellence in England (Syrett 2003; Littlejohns 2012), which is 
internationally recognised as a leader in this field. Yet while the GBA has a 
similar mandate and procedural arrangements are in place that are compa-
rable to NICE, the legal framework and corporatist structures in which 
the GBA is embedded differ from the institutional context of NICE. NICE 
decisions are ultimately politically sanctioned by Government (not corpo-
ratist actors) and are less likely to attract legal redress due to differences in 
legal practice, while the GBA as a corporatist decision-maker is exposed to 
both influences of corporatist interests and opportunities for legal chal-
lenge (Syrett 2004; Gress et al. 2005; Francke and Hart 2008; Landwehr 
and Böhm 2011; Klingler et al. 2013).
MetHodS
This case study is informed by documentary analysis and interviews. 
Documents include published protocols of parliamentary committees; 
published records of court decisions; selected articles from several broad-
sheet newspapers reporting on minimum volumes such as Der Spiegel, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Zeit and from professional jour-
nals such as Deutsches Ärzteblatt; scientific reports published by IQWIG 
and by researchers commissioned to undertake evidence reviews; materials 
from websites such as policy documents relating to minimum volumes 
published by the GBA and by corporatist organisations, as well as press 
releases published by these organisations.
The documentary analysis has been supplemented by a number of 
interviews with key informants (n  =  9), representing various types of 
policy- makers (government bureaucracy; corporatist organisations) and 
researchers. Interviewees were selected because of their knowledge of, 
and/or known involvement in, the process of developing minimum vol-
umes policy. The roles of individual interviewees will not be identified in 
the following analysis to ensure the level of anonymity and confidentiality 
agreed at interview.
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MInIMuM voluMeS In HoSPItal: PolIcy Idea 
and ScIentIfIc evIdence
Since the 1970s, health services research in the United States and else-
where suggested that for certain services, typically complex surgery, hospi-
tals that provided the service to a larger number of patients achieved better 
outcomes for patients (i.e. lower mortality and morbidity) than hospitals 
that provided the same service to a smaller number of patients (Luft et al. 
1979). Interviewees suggested that studies published by Birkmeyer and 
colleagues in the 1990s and early 2000s were particularly influential in 
turning a statistically observed association of volume and outcomes into a 
policy idea (Birkmeyer et al. 1999, 2002, 2003; Finlayson et al. 2003). The 
idea also appealed to policy-makers as it resonated with the common sense 
notion that ‘practice makes perfect’. Minimum volumes had already been 
ubiquitously used in medical training and accreditation, although they had 
not been used before to exclude hospitals from providing a service.
Regulating minimum volumes also fitted with the wider reform agenda 
for hospitals at the time. There were two concerns specifically: the per-
ceived inefficiency and costliness of hospital care compared to other coun-
tries and emerging concerns about variation in the quality and outcomes 
of care. The first concern was to be addressed by the introduction of 
activity- based payments as the main method of funding hospitals (Busse 
and Blümel 2014). For their proponents, namely sickness funds, mini-
mum volumes promised to speak to the second concern and to counter 
perceived risks to quality associated with the first.
However, despite being a policy idea inspired by scientific research, the 
scientific evidence base for operationalising the policy proved challenging. 
Evidence reviews suggested that there was a statistically significant rela-
tionship between higher volumes and improved outcomes for a number of 
complex surgical interventions such as pancreatic resection or oesopha-
gectomy (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002; IQWiG 2005, 
2008). These studies were typically observational (i.e. non-experimental) 
and were not considered as providing ultimate proof of causality. There 
were also limitations with regard to the data used in these studies, which 
typically relied on routinely collected information and were limited to cer-
tain populations or countries or groups of hospitals (e.g. in the US), rais-
ing questions about the transferability of their findings.
A further challenge was the difficulty of using studies indicating statisti-
cal correlations to support or set precise minimum volumes for specific 
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procedures. Studies typically used definitions of ‘high’ and ‘low’ volumes 
of service provisions, but these were set by researchers and driven by data 
availability. In addition, most studies originated in the US, with studies 
using German data only emerging over time. But analyses of German data 
were also difficult to interpret and almost impossible to use to inform 
minimum volumes. For example, in 2006, IQWIG, the research institute 
associated with the GBA, published an analysis of data on volumes and 
outcomes of total knee replacement surgery, using two indicators of out-
come quality (postsurgical mobility and infection) that produced conflict-
ing findings (IQWiG 2006).
In sum, while there was scientific evidence to support the selection of 
services which could benefit from minimum volumes, there was limited 
evidence to guide the selection of the specific volumes to be set in these 
cases. This substantially reduced the potential for explicit “evidence based” 
decision-making when it came to setting volumes. Minimum volumes so 
far have not lent themselves to any straight forward translation of “evi-
dence into policy”. More importantly, however, they have been controver-
sial from the outset, pitching against each other sickness funds as their 
proponents and hospitals as their vocal opposition. This conflict between 
payers and providers played out through all stages of the policy process 
with controversy surrounding the interpretation of the evidence often 
being at the centre of the argument. In addition, minimum volumes – as 
a regulatory policy  – created winners and losers among hospitals, with 
smaller hospitals with fewer patients likely to lose out to large teaching 
hospitals. The opposition, represented in the German Hospital Association, 
was therefore not entirely unified, making it more difficult for hospitals to 
mount resistance.
devISIng tHe legISlatIve fraMework
In 2001, the Federal Government – then composed of Social Democrats 
and the Green Party – brought a proposal for major reform of hospital 
funding before parliament. The proposal involved replacing the previous 
method of paying hospitals via budgets and per diems (payments per day 
of hospital stay) through a funding approach predominantly based on 
activity-based payments using diagnosis-related groups. The aim of this 
reform was to reduce perceived inefficiencies in hospital funding, reduce 
the length of stay of hospital inpatients, which were one of the longest in 
Europe, and to increase competition between hospitals. Minimum volumes 
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were introduced on the back of this reform, as a counter measure to 
known risks to quality associated with activity-based funding as its propo-
nents argued (Interview). They had the added attraction – especially for 
sickness funds and Social Democrats – of excluding hospitals with lower 
volumes from providing certain services, thus providing a lever for facili-
tating structural change in the (difficult to reform) hospital market.
Although the idea of regulating volumes of complex hospital services 
was inspired by research, scientific evidence, unsurprisingly, did not fea-
ture widely in the parliamentary discussion in which the legal framework 
for minimum volumes was developed. Instead, the procedural rules of 
parliamentary decision-making show a much clearer imprint on the result-
ing legislation, published as part of the 2002 Act on Case-Based Payment 
(Fallpauschalengesetz). In relation to minimum volumes, the 2002 Act 
stipulated that the relevant decision-making body of the self- administration 
(at that time the Hospital Committee and, from 2004, the GBA) should 
identify hospital services for which “the quality of outcomes particularly 
depended on the volume of services provided” and set minimum volumes 
for such services (Bundestag 2002b). The Act has since been integrated 
into Social Code Book V, now forming part of paragraph 137.
As the bill concerned hospital funding it directly touched on the legal 
responsibilities of the states and therefore required approval of both cham-
bers of parliament. In the Bundestag, the bill was discussed in the Health 
Committee, which introduced a number of amendments including that 
minimum volumes should only be applied to ‘planable’ services (planbar), 
thus excluding urgent or emergency services. The Health Committee 
(composed of members of the Bundestag reflecting the proportionate rep-
resentation of its constituent political parties) also requested transitional 
arrangements for hospitals that wanted to invest in expanding or creating 
new services, for example, by employing a new specialist (Bundestag 
2001a). While seemingly reducing the scope of minimum volumes, the 
Health Committee also sharpened the bill by making minimum volumes 
binding on hospitals (instead of using them as guidelines as an earlier ver-
sion suggested) and by preventing sickness funds from reimbursing ser-
vices if hospitals continued to provide them in insufficient numbers. Taken 
together, the changes introduced by the Health Committee both suited 
the agenda of sickness funds and, to some extent, may have mollified hos-
pitals by limiting minimum volumes to elective services only.
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The states, represented in the Bundesrat, also made amendments to the 
bill as the documents of the Mediating Committee suggest. Specifically, 
the Committee (composed of members of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat) made provisions that allowed states to exempt individual hos-
pitals from minimum volumes if they found access to services at risk within 
a given geographic area (Bundestag 2002a).
There is no indication in the documents examined that parliamentary 
committees concerned themselves with an interpretation of the scientific 
evidence available in support of minimum volumes. However, the result-
ing legislation, purposefully or unwittingly, included a clause where the 
specific wording lends itself to being interpreted as stipulating that specific 
minimum volumes had to be supported by scientific evidence. Specifically, 
the Act stated that “the quality of outcomes particularly depended on the 
volume of services provided” [emphasis added]. This clause had signifi-
cant influence on how the law was subsequently interpreted and applied 
both by corporatist policy actors (i.e. the associations in favour and against, 
as well as the GBA as decision-making body) and by social courts involved 
in legal adjudication.
SettIng MInIMuM voluMeS: tHe role 
of tHe federal JoInt coMMIttee
With the passage of the Act, federal legislators mandated the self- 
administration to identify hospital services suitable for minimum volumes 
and to set volume thresholds. This task fell initially to the Hospital 
Committee (Ausschuss Krankenhaus), formed by the top associations of 
sickness funds, the German Hospital Association and the Medical 
Association (Ärztekammer), and, from 2004, to the newly formed GBA.
The legal mandate required associations of sickness funds and hospitals 
(with participation from a number of other organisations such as private 
health insurers) to jointly identify the ‘catalogue of planable services’ and 
to set minimum volumes for these services (MMV 2002). As constituents 
of the committee, both (groups of) associations brought their own posi-
tions and interests of their members to the negotiating table. Sickness 
funds, as noted above, were keen to establish minimum volumes as a pol-
icy instrument for quality assurance and structural change. The hospital 
association, in contrast, wanted to prevent their introduction and, as this 
had failed, to limit the number of services minimum volumes would apply 
to and keep volume thresholds low.
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While unable to openly reject quality assurance as an objective, the 
main strategy of the hospital association was to highlight the risks to 
patients potentially arising from minimum volumes. These risks came in 
two flavours: The first argument was that minimum volumes would endan-
ger access to care for patients by reducing the geographic coverage of 
services:
In addition, the proposed bill suggests minimum volumes for hospitals. Yet 
the application of minimum volumes can exclude hospitals [from service 
provision] in an unjustified way, which would endanger access to services for 
patients. [DKG, Press release, 1 Feb 02]
A second line of argument was that minimum volumes were insuffi-
ciently supported by scientific evidence and were ‘unfair’ to low-volume 
hospitals that would produce good outcomes (Interview). Legislators had 
pre-empted the first line of argument by allowing state authorities to grant 
exemptions on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of geographic equity. 
However, the second argument – insufficient evidence – was more suc-
cessful in challenging the appropriateness of minimum volumes and 
obstructing their implementation. This position has been maintained to 
this day in a slightly modified version, with the hospital association argu-
ing that service volumes as surrogate parameter being less meaningful and 
therefore more likely to be unfair than indicators that measure quality 
directly (DKG 2014). While this is scientifically correct, it also raises the 
bar for regulation as it is not at all clear how other quality indicators would 
be operationalised to impact on hospitals’ practice of service provision.
A first list of complex surgical procedures was agreed by the Hospital 
Committee in 2003, comprising liver transplants, kidney transplants, com-
plex surgery of the oesophageal system and the pancreatic system, and 
stem cell transplantation. For these services, thresholds were set between 
5 and 20 per hospital per year (liver transplantation 10; kidney translation 
20; oesophageal surgery 5, pancreatic surgery 5, stem cell transplantation 
10–14) (MMV 2002).
Interviewees commented that these procedures had been considered as 
relatively uncontroversial, as their share in service delivery and potential 
financial impact on hospitals was small and volume thresholds low 
(Interview). They were also reflective of the services analysed in existing 
studies (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002). The limited 
selection of services and the low thresholds thus suggest compromise 
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between hospital and sickness fund associations on the lowest common 
denominator. In contrast, minimum volumes proposed by sickness funds 
(e.g. the Verband der Angestellten-Krankenkassen) had been much more 
ambitious, for example, for oesophageal and pancreatic surgery (both 10), 
coronary surgery (100), carotid surgery (20), percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty (150), breast cancer surgery (150) (Geraedts 2002).
In 2004, following the formation of the GBA, two further procedures 
were added to the list: total knee replacement and coronary surgery 
(BMGS 2004). However, no volumes were set at the time and coronary 
surgery – arguably a high volume service – would not be pursued any fur-
ther. More controversially, in 2005, a threshold of 50 cases per hospital 
and year was set for total knee replacements (BMGS 2005). Neonatal 
services for babies with very low birth weight were added by the GBA in 
2009 (GBA 2009). These two decisions involving services with high vol-
umes (knee replacement) and high costs (neonatal care) proved highly 
contested and were both subsequently challenged in court by hospitals.
At the time, two ‘evidence reports’  – one commissioned by sickness 
funds and authored by Rathmann and Windeler (2002) and the other 
commissioned by the Federal Chamber of Physicians and authored by 
Geraedts (2002) – appeared to have influenced the selection of services for 
minimum volumes. Both reports were able to identify procedures such as 
complex surgery of oesophageal tumours for which evidence of a robust 
volume-outcome relationship existed. However, as these studies were 
observational and relied on routine data, their authors took care to men-
tion that the evidence did not lend itself to suggesting volume thresholds. 
They also pointed out that studies did not identify the mechanisms, or 
factors, that would explain why higher volumes produced better outcomes. 
In other words, while these reviews established the problem and provided 
a rationale for action, they were unable to suggest specific solutions.
However, despite the known limitations of the evidence base, the 2003 
agreement stipulated that future minimum volumes should be based on 
scientific evidence. Specifically, it stated that decisions should be taken 
based on ‘epidemiological and empirical knowledge’ and applied in ‘a 
transparent and rule-based process’ (MMV 2002: 1). Not only should 
future minimum volumes require evidence of a causal relationship between 
volume and outcomes, they also required proof that improved outcomes 
were predominantly caused by higher volumes (‘im überwiegenden Teil’). 
Thus the 2003 agreement suggested that minimum volumes should only 
be set if volume was proven to be the decisive factor for variation in 
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 outcomes. This wording echoed similar terminology in the law (‘in beson-
derem Maβe’) but further raised the bar as to which types of evidence were 
regarded sufficient. However, evidence of volume being more influential 
than other factors was difficult to come by for practical reasons (i.e. such 
studies did not exist) and scientific reasons (i.e. volume is a proxy for 
other factors thus can never be decisive).
Unsurprisingly, this move towards evidence-based medicine in justify-
ing minimum volumes was celebrated by the hospital association:
Paragraph 3 of the agreement includes a procedural rule that stipulates that 
the setting of minimum volumes for certain services require an evidence- 
based process and scientific evaluation. [DKV, 4 Dec 03]
In 2004, having replaced the Hospital Committee, the GBA asked its 
newly created research institute, IQWiG, to examine the evidence of a 
volume-outcome relationship and to identify thresholds for total knee 
replacement (IQWiG 2005). Published in 2005, the IQWiG report noted 
that a volume-outcome relationship was plausible, but could not be proven 
in the absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2005). In addition, the 
analysis of hospital data on volumes and outcomes for total knee replace-
ment (using the outcome measures ‘post-surgical mobility’ and ‘infection 
after surgery’) resulted in conflicting findings, with one indicator showing 
a decline in desired outcomes at higher volumes and the other showing 
steady improvement. Individually and jointly the analyses of these indica-
tors did not indicate that there is an ideal volume threshold. A later report 
by IQWiG relating to the treatment of very premature babies with very 
low birth weight also concluded that a causal relationship between volume 
and outcomes was likely, but could not be regarded as ultimately proven 
due to the absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2008).
Since its inception the GBA has been committed to stringent evidence 
use, prompted by controversies over the reimbursement of pharmaceuti-
cals and medical procedures, often involving legal action from manufac-
turers. There has also been a drive to professionalise procedures with 
several documents specifying its by-laws and code of practice. There was a 
notable effort to apply similarly robust approaches to decisions on mini-
mum volumes, resulting in the commissioning of reviews and additional 
data analyses prepared by IQWiG.  In commissioning these studies, the 
GBA explicitly followed established best practice, including the publica-
tion of protocols and peer review. In compliance with its by-laws, the GBA 
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provided explicit rationales for its decisions, made this information pub-
licly available and gave due consideration to reports commissioned from 
its research institute (GBA 2008).
Yet despite this emphasis on procedural robustness, the GBA found 
itself in a position in which it was impossible to base minimum volume 
decisions on evidence alone. This happened because the scientific evidence 
in support of specific threshold was inconclusive. In addition, being a 
membership organisation, the GBA continued to be exposed to the parti-
san interests of its member organisations, in one instance rejecting a study 
brought in by the hospital association which aimed to demonstrate that a 
volume-outcome relationship was inexistent (GBA 2010). There was thus 
substantial tension between two procedural rules, those set out in by-laws 
which aim at ensuring transparency and due process, and those associated 
with the corporatist nature of the GBA and the practice of negotiating 
consensus between the organised interests in health care. In the end, deci-
sions about minimum volumes were taken by majority vote, which over-
ruled the resistance of the hospital association. Yet this did not end the 
controversy.
adJudIcatIon by tHe SocIal courtS
Following the introduction of minimum volumes for total knee replace-
ment at a level of 50 per hospital and year and of increasing existing vol-
umes for very premature babies from 14 to 30 (GBA 2013), several 
hospitals took legal action against sickness funds which had refused to pay 
for services delivered at lower numbers than required. Both cases led to a 
judicial review of the GBA decisions at state level (the Social Court of 
Berlin-Brandenburg, here referred to as ‘state court’), and, subsequently, 
at federal level (by the Federal Social Court, here the ‘federal court’).
Three questions were considered in the courts specifically: (1). Whether 
the GBA was entitled to set minimum volumes that are binding on hospi-
tals; (2). whether the selection of services to apply minimum volumes to 
was in compliance with the law (i.e. SGB 5), especially whether these ser-
vices were ‘planable’ (in the case of services for preterm babies) and 
whether there was sufficient evidence of a ‘particular’ relationship between 
volume and outcome; and (3). whether specific minimum volumes set had 
been sufficiently justified by the GBA, including by recourse to scientific 
evidence.
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On the first question, the state and federal courts upheld consistently 
that the GBA was entitled and mandated by parliament to set binding 
minimum volumes; however, the courts emphasised that, in compliance 
with German administrative law, the GBA had to explain and justify such 
decisions (BSG 2012a, b).
On the second question, the federal court ruled that services are legiti-
mately selected if they are ‘planable’ in the sense that they can be accessed 
without posing additional risks to patients, arising, for example, from longer 
journeys to (fewer) hospitals. In relation to care for very premature babies, 
the court argued, referencing national and international studies, that the 
benefits for mothers-to-be outweighed the risks associated with longer 
travel (BSG 2012a: para 43). The court thus rejected an interpretation of 
‘planable’ as ‘elective’ or ‘predictable’, as both terms would not consider the 
balance of risks and benefits to patients (BSG 2012a: para 30).
The courts also referred to research to clarify the meaning of the law 
with regard to the ‘particular’ causal relationship between volumes and 
outcomes required by law to justify specific minimum volumes. In 2011, 
the state court ruled that a causal relationship could only be regarded as 
‘particular’ if ‘controlled studies’ suggested a statistical relationship (LSG 
2011: para 87). The state court thus aligned the wording of the law with 
the concept of the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ used in evidence-based medi-
cine, which considers RCTs as the strongest research design to establish 
claims of causality.
This ruling was revised by the federal court in 2012 and confirmed in 
subsequent decisions in 2014 and 2015. The federal court argued that the 
law should not be interpreted as giving preference to particularly types of 
studies, especially since in the case of minimum volumes RCTs were nei-
ther practical nor ethical. Evidence from scientific studies would suffice if 
a causal relationship was ‘probable and plausible’ (BSG 2012b: para 31). 
However, such decisions would require additional support in the form of 
‘medical experience’ (medizinische Erfahrungssätze) (BSG 2012b: 39). 
Such medical experience is often used in court decisions by inviting expert 
witnesses (Sachverständige), although in this case the courts largely relied 
on written statements from the GBA in justification if its position.
The third question discussed by the courts was whether specific mini-
mum volumes had been sufficiently explained and justified by the 
GBA. The review of such justifications drew heavily on scientific evidence, 
although courts came to different conclusions about the level of justifica-
tion needed for minimum volumes to be considered legal. For the state 
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court in 2011, evidence was insufficient in the absence of experimental 
studies, which meant that the minimum volumes in question were unjusti-
fied (LSG 2011). Rejecting this ruling, the federal court argued – in line 
with its earlier reasoning – that minimum volumes were sufficiently justi-
fied if they were likely to improve outcomes, if the statistical association 
would be supported by ‘medical experience’ and if potential risks arising 
from minimum volumes (e.g. longer distances) would be outweighed by 
the potential benefits (BSG 2012a, 2014).
This weighing of risks and benefits led the federal court to come to dif-
ferent conclusions when considering specific minimum volumes. It argued 
that minimum volumes of 14 cases of very preterm babies per year were 
justified noting that 14 cases (roughly one per month) were sufficient to 
require the presence of a specialist team in a hospital. The existence of 
such a team would make quality improvements plausible. In a similar vein, 
it argued that 50 total knee replacements (roughly one per week on aver-
age) would be sufficient to require the hospital to employ a specialist team 
(BSG 2012a, 2014).
Using the same rationale, the federal court rejected minimum volumes 
of 30 per year for very preterm babies on the grounds that the higher 
threshold would increase the risks to those babies by excluding hospitals 
with lower volumes (but potentially providing good quality services) with-
out necessarily increasing the benefits (BSG 2012b: para 60–61). It spe-
cifically cited four studies in support of this suggestion, one of which had 
been included in a systematic review (i.e. by IQWiG) and another one had 
been rejected by the GBA in an earlier version and was co-funded by the 
hospital association (GBA 2010; Kutschmann et al. 2012). While these 
studies made valid points about the limited ability of minimum volumes to 
separate high from low performing hospitals entirely accurately, the ruling 
gave prominence to a few selected studies while disregarding all the others 
included in previous scientific reviews.
In conclusion, the analysis of court decisions suggests that scientific 
evidence was of relevance to the legal adjudication on minimum volumes 
to establish whether specific minimum volumes set by the GBA were suf-
ficiently justified in the eyes of the law. However, the decision itself was 
not based on evidence but on principles of plausibility and proportionality 
established in legal practice, which were then supported by research. Key 
to establishing conformity with the law was that the setting of minimum 
volumes was demonstrably proven to have been deliberated, with consid-
eration given to the available evidence, and that a justification was pro-
vided that could be reviewed in court.
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dIScuSSIon and concluSIon
This chapter has examined the development of minimum volume policy as 
a case study of health policy making in Germany. It specifically analysed 
the policy process and the way in which policy decisions were supported 
by evidence. It has argued that evidence use was mostly strategic: corpo-
ratist actors such as the hospital association and sickness funds commis-
sioned research to support their aims; the hospital association consistently 
promoted evidence use (specifically the ‘highest’ level of evidence such as 
RCTs, which for minimum volumes does not exist) as a cornerstone of 
decisions on specific minimum volumes; it also brought in its own, i.e. co- 
funded, studies to underline its position that minimum volumes do not 
make a meaningful contribution to quality assurance.
The formation of the GBA and IQWiG in 2004 has changed the rules 
of the argumentative game, with new procedures developed for, and 
applied to, decision-making and scientific evidence use. Decision-making 
had previously been dominated by the consensual arrangements character-
istic of corporatism. Consensual arrangements have been maintained in 
the GBA to some extent, however, decisions are eventually taken by 
majority vote, which means that resistance by providers can be overcome 
provided there is a majority. Decision-making procedures have become 
more rule-based, for example as they relate to commissioning evidence 
reviews from the IQWIG and considering its findings. This suggests that 
scientific evidence has become a substantial aspect of the GBA’s approach 
to legitimising its decisions in relation to minimum volumes. This chimes 
with findings from Boswell (2008), as well as Bijker et al. (2009), which 
describe the transfer of scientific authority to decision-making bodies 
helping them to legitimise their actions. Similar observations have been 
made in relation to decisions involving HTA where the legislator has 
recently tightened the framework for decisions for inpatient services pre-
venting the GBA to exclude services in the absence of evidence. New hos-
pital services have to be proven to be either less effective than existing 
treatments or harmful, thus setting a high bar to evidentiary support for 
decisions about service exclusions (Olberg et al. 2014).
Still, in relation to minimum volumes the analysis also echoes findings 
that emphasise the negotiated nature of decisions (Etgeton 2009), sug-
gesting that policy actors who are constituent members of the GBA engage 
in strategic uses of evidence to support their claims and promote their 
interests. Corporatist structures have changed and become more pluralist, 
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adversarial and less consensus oriented. While some have argued that the 
GBA is particularly well placed for taking unpopular decisions in contested 
policy fields such as service exclusions from the public benefits package 
(Gerlinger 2010), the present state of affairs suggests that such decisions 
often end up in court. Courts then weigh the scientific evidence provided 
in support of a decision to establish whether the GBA has provided suffi-
cient justification, although cognisant (perhaps increasingly so) of the lim-
its of such evidence. This analysis suggests however that substantive 
disagreements between different organised interests do not disappear by 
evoking the authority of scientific evidence. Evidence use as ‘technocratic 
fix’ is unlikely to solve the legitimacy problems of organisations charged 
with unpopular decisions (Syrett 2003). Decisions that directly affect the 
interests of policy actors, perhaps especially so if these have financial impli-
cations and impact on notions of professional autonomy, are likely to 
remain contested and have a fair chance to require legal adjudication. The 
GBA is routinely taken to court by pharmaceutical producers (and some-
times patients) contesting decisions to exclude medicinal products from 
public reimbursement, which is a well-trodden (though not necessarily 
successful) avenue given that access to legal review is easy in the German 
legal system. In this case here, smaller hospitals are particularly likely to be 
affected by minimum volumes and while the hospital association opposed 
the policy almost throughout (although there are signs of partial accep-
tance following repeated confirmation by the judiciary (DKG 2014)) hos-
pitals affected by the policy have found their interests directly at stake and 
have sought legal redress individually.
The policy process analysed here arguably does not tell the full story of 
minimum volumes, as it focuses on three specific stages of decision- making 
while largely ignoring the dynamics of agenda-setting prior to the parlia-
mentary debate, and the actual impact of minimum volumes in practice. 
There is now clear evidence that minimum volume regulation is widely 
ignored by hospitals and sickness funds are incapable of retrieving funding 
from hospitals if services turn out to have been delivered in volumes below 
the threshold (de Cruppé et al. 2014; Peschke et al. 2014).
Court decisions also have tended to directly affect how the GBA went 
about making decisions, with some noting that the first court cases led to 
more attention given to future evidentiary support for decisions. It also 
led to the GBA ceasing to introduce further minimum volumes. Meanwhile, 
sickness funds have asked parliament to change the wording of the law to 
reduce the requirement on evidentiary support for minimum volumes 
 THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE USE IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING… 
130 
(Leber 2014). In December 2015, a new law (the Act to Reform the 
Structures of Hospital Provision, KHSG) removed the phrase ‘in beson-
derem Maβe’ (i.e. the particular relationship of volume and outcome) 
from the SGB 5 to make specific minimum volumes more defensible in 
court and introduce a process that would make it easier for sickness funds 
to withhold funding from hospitals for services under the threshold. 
Whether this will increase the number of minimum volumes introduced 
by the GBA in future and, indeed, further changes the balance between 
payers and providers in the still corporatist system of health policy making 
in Germany remains to be seen.
The analysis above has shown that various forms of strategic evidence 
use dominate the example of minimum volume policy in Germany. While 
it is clear that strategic use of evidence does not entirely preclude notions 
of ‘evidence-based policy’ – as evidence can also have a substantive impact 
on decisions  – this analysis suggests that expectations of ‘instrumental’ 
evidence use are likely to be disappointed. Changes in corporatist decision- 
making, namely the formation of the GBA, have brought about new 
opportunities for evidence use, necessitated by the GBA’s need to legiti-
mise its decisions, including in court. But this has not reduced the poten-
tial for contestation or has fully established the idea of instrumental (i.e. 
objective) evidence use.
These findings hint at the contextual nature of evidence use in policy- 
making, which is shaped by the specific institutional arrangements of 
health care governance and the wider political system that influence the 
motivation of policy actors and organisations to use evidence to legitimise 
decisions. While the case of minimum volumes has shown that evidentiary 
support is necessary for such GBA decisions, evidence was not the only, or 
indeed most relevant, source of legitimacy, as legitimation is also derived 
from parliamentary law-making, corporatist governance and legal adjudi-
cation by the judiciary.
referenceS
Bandelow, N. 2004. Akteure und Interessen in der Gesundheitspolitik: Vom 
Korporatismus zum Pluralismus? Politische Bildung 37 (1): 49–63.
———. 2009. Health governance in the aftermath of traditional corporatism: One 
small step for the legislator, one giant leap for the subsystem? German Policy 
Studies 5 (1): 43–63.
Bijker, W.E., R. Bal, and R. Hendriks. 2009. The paradox of scientific authority. The 
role of scientific advice in democracies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
S. ETTELT
 131
Birkmeyer, J.D., S.R. Finlayson, A.N. Tosteson, S.M. Sharp, A.L. Warshaw, and 
E.S. Fisher. 1999. Effect of hospital volume on in-hospital mortality with pan-
creaticoduodenectomy. Surgery 125 (3): 250–256.
Birkmeyer, J.D., A.E. Siewers, E.V. Finlayson, T.A. Stukel, F.L. Lucas, I. Batista, 
H.G. Welch, and D.E. Wennberg. 2002. Hospital volume and surgical mortal-
ity in the United States. New England Journal of Medicine 346 (15): 1128–1137.
Birkmeyer, J.D., T.A. Stukel, A.E. Siewers, P.P. Goodney, D.E. Wennberg, and 
F.L. Lucas. 2003. Surgeon volume and operative mortality in the United States. 
New England Journal of Medicine 349 (22): 2117–2127.
Blum, S., and K. Schubert, eds. 2013. Policy analysis in Germany. Bristol: Policy 
Press.
BMGS. 2004. Beschluss des Gemeinsamen Bundesausschusses nach § 91 Abs. 7 
des Fünften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB V) zur Aufnahme in den 
Mindestmengenkatalog nach § 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Nr. 3 SGB V vom 21. 
September 2004. Berlin, Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale 
Sicherung.
———. 2005. Bekanntmachung eines Beschlusses des Gemeinsamen 
Bundesausschusses nach § 91 Abs. 7 des Fünften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch 
(SGB V) zur Festlegung einer Mindestmenge nach § 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 SGB V 
vom 16. August 2005. Berlin, Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale 
Sicherung.
Boswell, C. 2008. The political functions of expert knowledge: Knowledge and 
legitimation in European Union immigration policy. Journal of European 
Public Policy 15 (4): 471–488.
BSG. 2012a. Urteil vom 12 September, B 3 KR 10/12 R.  Kassel, 
Bundessozialgericht.
———. 2012b. Urteil vom 18 Dezember, B 1 KR 34/12 R.  Kassel, 
Bundessozialgericht.
———. 2014. Urteil vom 14 Oktober 2014, B 1 KR 33/13 R.  Kassel, 
Bundessozialgericht.
Bundestag. 2001a. Bericht des Ausschusses für Gesundheit, 14. Wahlperiode, 
Drucksache 14/7862. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag.
———. 2001b. Beschlussempfehlung des Ausschusses für Gesundheit, 14. 
Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/7824. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag.
———. 2002a. Beschlussempfehlung des Vermittlungsausschusses zu dem Gesetz 
zur Einführung des diagnose-orientierten Fallpauschalensystems für 
Krankenhäuser (Fallpauschalengesetz  – FPG), 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
14/8362. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag.
———. 2002b. Gesetz zur Einführung des diagnose-orientierten Fallpauschalen-
systems für Krankenhäuser (Fallpauschalengesetz – FPG). Bundesgesetzblatt 1: 
1412–1438.
Busse, R., and M. Blümel. 2014. Germany: Health system review. Health Systems 
in Transition 10 (2): 1–296.
 THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE USE IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING… 
132 
de Cruppé, W., M.  Malik, and M.  Geraedts. 2014. Umsetzung der 
Mindestmengenvorgaben: Analyse der Krankenhausqualitätsberichte. Deutsches 
Ärzteblatt 111 (33–34): 549–555.
DKG. 2014. Positionen der Deutschen Krankenhausgesellschaft zur Weiterentwick-
lung der Qualitätssicherung und der Patientensicherheit. Berlin: Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft.
Etgeton, S. 2009. Patientenbeteiligung in den Strukturen des Gemeinsamen 
Bundesausschusses. Bundesgesundheitsblatt-Gesundheitsforschung-
Gesundheitsschutz 52 (1): 104–110.
Finlayson, E.V., P.P. Goodney, and J.D. Birkmeyer. 2003. Hospital volume and 
operative mortality in cancer surgery: A national study. Archives of Surgery 138 
(7): 721–725.
Francke, R., and D. Hart. 2008. Einführung in die rechtlichen Aspekte bei HTAs. 
Zeitschrift fuer Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualität im Gesundheitswesen 102: 
63–68.
GBA. 2008. Verfahrensordnung des Gemeinsamen Bundesausschusses (in its ver-
sion of January 2014). Berlin: Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss.
———. 2009. Bekanntmachung eines Beschlusses des Gemeinsamen Bundesauss-
chusses zur Versorgung von Früh- und Neugeborenen vom 20. Bundesanzei-
ger 195: 4450.
———. 2010. Tragende Gründe zum Beschluss des Gemeinsamen Bundesauss-
chusses über eine Änderung der Anlage 1 der Mindestmengevereinbarung: 
Mindestmengen bei Früh- und Neugeborenen vom 17. Juni. Berlin: Gemeins-
amer Bundesausschuss.
———. 2013. Geschaeftsbericht 2012. Berlin: Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss.
Geraedts, M. 2002. Evidenz zur Ableitung von Mindestmengen in der Medizin. 
Gutachten im Auftrag der Bundesärztekammer. Düsseldorf, Heinrich- 
Heine-Universität.
Gerlinger, T. 2010. Health care reform in Germany. German Policy Studies 6 (1): 
107–142.
Greenhalgh, T., and J. Russell. 2007. Reframing evidence synthesis as rhetorical 
action in the policy making drama. Politiques de Santé 1: 34–42.
Gress, S., D. Niebuhr, H. Rothgang, and J. Wasem. 2005. Criteria and procedures 
for determining benefits packages in health care. A comparative perspective. 
Health Policy 73: 78–91.
Hansson, F. 2006. Organizational use of evaluations: Governance and control in 
research evaluation. Evaluation 12 (2): 159–178.
Hind, D. 2007. The threat to reason: How the enlightenment was hijacked and how 
we can reclaim it. London: Verso.
IQWiG. 2005. Entwicklung und Anwendung von Modellen zur Berechnung von 
Schwellenwerten bei Mindestmengen für Knie-Totalendoprothese. Abschlussb-
ericht. Cologne: Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheits-
wesen.
S. ETTELT
 133
———. 2006. Entwicklung und Erstellung eines Prognosemodells zur Ermittlung 
der Auswirkungen von Schwellenwerten auf die Versorgung. Abschlussbericht. 
Cologne: Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen.
———. 2008. Zusammenhang zwischen Leistungsmenge und Ergebnis bei der 
Versorung von Früh- und Neugeborenen mit sehr geringem Geburtsgewicht. 
Abschlussbericht. Cologne, Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im 
Gesundheitswesen.
———. 2015. Aufgaben und Ziele des IQWiG. https://www.iqwig.de/de/
ueber-uns/aufgaben-und-ziele.2946.html. Accessed 14 Jan 2015.
Jun, U., and K.  Grabow. 2008. Mehr Expertise in der deutschen Politik? Zur 
Übertragbarkeit des “Evidence-based policy approach”. Bertelsmann Stiftung: 
Gütersloh.
Kieslich, K. 2012. Social values and health priority setting in Germany. Journal of 
Health Organization and Management 26 (3): 374–383.
Klingler, C., S.M. Shah, A.J. Barron, and J.S. Wright. 2013. Regulatory space and 
the contextual mediation of common functional pressures: Analyzing the fac-
tors that led to the German Efficiency Frontier approach. Health Policy 109: 
270–280.
Kloten, N. 2006. Wissenschaftliche Beratung der Politik: Befund und Auftrag. 
Politikberatung in Deutschland. Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 123–145.
Knieps, F. 2009. Evidence based health policy oder wissenschaftlich verbrämter 
Lobbyismus  – Die Verwertung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse in der 
Gesundheitspolitik. Zeitschrift für Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualität im 
Gesundheitswesen 103 (5): 273–280.
Kutschmann, M., S.  Bungard, J.  Kötting, A.  Trümner, C.  Fusch, and C.  Veit. 
2012. Versorgung von Frühgeborenen mit einem Geburtsgewicht unter 1 250 
g. Deutsches Ärzteblatt 109 (31–32): 519–528.
Landwehr, C., and K. Böhm. 2011. Delegation and institutional design in health-
care rationing. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions 24 (4): 665–688.
Leber, W.-D. 2014. Mindestmengen. AQUA-Tagung „Qualität kennt keine 
Grenzen“, Göttingen, May 14. http://tagung-2014.sqg.de/2014/ppt/P4-1-
fol_G%C3%B6ttingen_2014_05_14_AQUA_Mindestmengen_Dr%20Leber_
final.pdf. Accessed 17 Jan 2015.
Lehmbruch, G. 1988. Der Neokorporatismus der Bundesrepublik im internationalen 
Vergleich und die „Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen “. Neokorporatismus 
und Gesundheitswesen. G. Gäfgen. Baden-Baden, Nomos: 11–32.
Lijphart, A., and M.  Crepaz. 1991. Corporatism and consensus democracy in 
eighteen countries: Conceptual and empirical linkages. British Journal of 
Political Science 21 (2): 235–246.
Littlejohns, P. 2012. Social values and health priority setting in England: ‘values’ 
based decision making. Journal of Health Organization and Management 26 
(3): 363–371.
 THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE USE IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING… 
134 
LSG. 2011. Urteil vom 17. August 2011, L 7 KA 77/08 KL.  Potsdam, 
Landessozialgericht Berlin-Brandenburg.
Luft, H.S., J.P. Bunker, and A.C. Enthoven. 1979. Should operations be regional-
ized? The empirical relation between surgical volume and mortality. The New 
England Journal of Medicine 301 (25): 1364–1369.
Majone, G. 1989. Evidence, argument, and persuasion in the policy process. Yale: 
Yale University Press.
Marmot, M.G. 2004. Evidence based policy or policy based evidence? Willingness 
to take action influences the view of the evidence – Look at alcohol. BMJ 328: 
906–907.
Mayntz, R. 2009. Speaking truth to power: Leitlinien für die Regelung wissen-
schaftlicher Politikberatung. Zeitschrift fuer Public Policy, Recht und 
Management 1: 5–16.
McNulty, J.  2012. Symbolic uses of evaluation in the international aid sector: 
Arguments for critical reflection. Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, 
Debate and Practice 8 (4): 495–509.
MMV. 2002. Vereinbarung gemäss Paragraph 137 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Nr. 3 SGB 
5 – Mindestmengenvereinbarung.
Olberg, B., M. Perleth, and R. Busse. 2014. The new regulation to investigate 
potentially beneficial diagnostic and therapeutic methods in Germany: Up to 
international standard? Health Policy 117: 135–145.
Perleth, M., B. Gibis, and B. Goehlen. 2009. A short history of health technology 
assessment in Germany. International Journal of Technology Assessment in 
Health Care 25 (Suppl 1): 112–119.
Peschke, D., U. Nimptsch, and T. Mansky. 2014. Umsetzung der Mindestmen-
genvorgaben: Analyse der DRG-Daten. Deutsches Ärzteblatt 111 (33-34): 
556–563.
Rathmann, W., and J. Windeler. 2002. Zusammenhang zwischen Behandlungs-
menge und Behandlungsqualität. Evidenzbericht. Essen: Medizinischer Dienst 
der Spitzenverbände der Krankenkassen.
Renn, O. 1995. Style of using scientific expertise: A comparative framework. 
Science and Public Policy 22 (3): 147–156.
Siefken, S.T. 2007. Expertenkommissionen im politischen Prozess. Eine Bilanz zur 
rot-grünen Bundesregierung 1998–2005. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwis-
senschaften.
Strueck, C. 2013. Public interest groups and policy analysis: A push for evidence-
based policy-making? In Policy analysis in Germany, ed. S.  Blum and 
K. Schubert, 217–230. Bristol: Policy Press.
Suchman, M.C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of Management Review 20 (3): 571–610.
S. ETTELT
 135
Syrett, K. 2003. A technocratic fix to the ‘legitimacy problem’? The Blair 
Government and health care rationing in the United Kingdom. Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law 28 (4): 715–746.
———. 2004. Impotence or importance? Judicial review in an era of explicit NHS 
rationing. Modern Law Review 67 (2): 289–321.
Tsebelis, G. 2011. Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Weingart, P. 1999. Scientific expertise and political accountability: Paradoxes of 
sciences in politics. Science and Public Policy 26 (3): 151–161.
Weiss, C.H. 1979. The many meanings of research utilization. Public Administra-
tion Review 39 (5): 426–431.
Open Access   This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the per-
mitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
 THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE USE IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING… 
